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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/07/2011

Accident number: 742

Accident time: 10:25

Accident Date: 12/03/2011

Where it occurred: Task:
AF/1302/00342/MF585
7, Dood Kash village,
Pulikhumri district,
Baghlan province
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: None

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast

Ground condition: hard
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 11/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
inadequate training (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACCA
“Lessons Learned” document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original
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formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group]-04 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
Investigation team was convened by AMAC Kunduz to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] MDG-04. A separate investigation team
was also assigned by [Demining group] for internal investigation of this accident. The accident
occurred at 10:25 hours, 12 Mar 2011 in task number AF/1302/00342/MF5857, located in
Dood Kash village, Pulikhumri district of Baghlan province.
SUMMARY:
Task No AF/1302/00342/MF5857 is located on the top of hill, which had been contaminated
with anti-personnel mines by Kaya Militias during 1992 to 1998. This area was mined by
militia forces in order to protect their positions from the attacks of government forces. The
terrain of area is hilltop and rocky.
Presence of mines there posed a direct risk to the workers of coal mine and local people,
therefore, they requested clearance of the site. This area was polygon surveyed by [Other
demining group] in Feb 2009 with a size of 64000 sqm. According to [Demining group] 1389
plan, clearance operations started there on 17 Feb 2011, [Demining group]-04 cleared 7640
sqm and destroyed 6 PMN2 mines till accident time.
According to external investigation report, the accident happened during the prodding
operation on a detected signal. According to the witness statements the deminer may had
been failed to pinpoint the signal or he may had started prodding directly from the top of it and
not maintained the right angle of the prodder. The density of rocks there and hardness of the
ground required more attention to be paid by deminer during the operation, but it seems that
he was working in hurry without considering standard operating procedures to be applied
during signal investigation. The record of QA shows that this team had not been visited by
internal QA. Fortunately the deminer was dressed with PPE, so he got superficial injuries on
his body and dust in his eyes.
CONCLUSIONS:
The accident happened due to inattention of deminer to standard operating procedure when
he was investigating a detected signal.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The deminers should be briefed by command group about the worksite conditions and the
obstacles in the task and advise them to be careful and follow the standard operating
procedures.
The command group of the teams should make sure that the deminers are well aware about
the worksite conditions and taking due care during the operations.
[Demining group] internal QA section is recommended to increase QA visits to the teams, find
the shortfalls and recommend appropriate corrective/preventive actions.
Refresher training is recommended to the team covering the use of detectors, pinpointing
signals and prodding and excavation drills.
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Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to
be submitted to the MACCA Operations department by no later than 7 days, effective to the
issue date of this letter.

Victim Report
Victim number: 933

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "Superficial injuries on his body and dust
in eyes."

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Inadequate training because the investigators
found that the Victim had either not used his detector properly, not used the correct
excavation procedures, or both. The secondary cause is listed as a Field control inadequacy
because the field supervisors should have corrected these errors.
The Inadequate investigation listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report.
The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years in
contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible
than the internationals with overall responsibility.
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